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Abstract
During the past two decades, the  “Washington Consensus” has been the dominant recipe for 
unleashing economic growth in developing countries. In view of  the strong criticism mounted 
against  it,  it  seems  to have lost  prominence recently.  The success  of  the East  Asian newly 
industrialized economies and recently of  China is  often seen as  an alternative  way towards 
economic development. However, most instruments stipulated in the Washington Consensus can 
be reconciled with successful measures employed by industrialized or fastly industrializing Asian 
economies. Most likely, the stability and market orientation of  the Washington Consensus as a 
recommendation for developing countries is not wrong in itself  but rather incomplete. In order 
to give developing countries a perspective for durable and preferably inclusive growth, it must 
be complemented by a modern and market-oriented industrial policy aimed at upgrading the 
economy's competitiveness. Such a “newer” industrial policy offers a host of  instruments that 
can enhance economic growth in a generally favorable macroeconomic framework that can be 
achieved through the Washington Consensus. This  article  undertakes to integrate  industrial 
policy  in  a  comprehensive  toolbox  for  economic  growth  and  takes  Jordan  and  Egypt  as 
examples for how industrial policy measures are employed in practice.
Keywords: economic growth, industrial policy, regional policy, development policy, Washington 
Consensus, Jordan, Egypt
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1 Introduction1
The debate about  the “best” strategy for the economic development of  developing countries 
follows a cyclical pattern. While in the 1950s and 1960s import substitution and infant industry 
protection were fashionable,  the 1980s saw a growing popularity of  liberal,  market-oriented 
policies like those modeled after  the “Washington Consensus”  (Williamson 1990). During the 
1990s, approaches centered on an enabling and facilitating fole for government in the process of  
upgrading  the  economy's  competitiveness  emerged.  Among  these,  for  example,  were  the 
competitiveness and cluster policies introduced by Porter  (1990;  1998). The success stories of  
East Asian newly industrialized economies  (e.g. Chang 2001; Hirono 2001; Kang 2001; Wong 
and Ng 2001) and more recently of  China have inspired the search for ways to use a more active 
government role  to  spur  growth.  During  the  last  years,  global  financial  crises  have  lead  to 
widespread criticism against allegedly dysfunctional free markets and to calls for greater direct 
intervention of  governments in the economy. For example, Stiglitz (e.g. 2007) is a long-standing 
critic against the Washington Consensus and the market liberalism it embodies, or is assumed to 
embody.
This  cyclical  path  of  notions  demonstrates  the  delicate  balance  between  free  markets  and 
government intervention in the form of  industrial policy. In a market economy, free markets are 
the  rule  and  government  intervention is  an  exception  that  needs  to  be  justified.  Just  how 
frequent and how far-reaching this exception is (or whether it may factually even become the 
rule rather than an exception) is subject to continuous debate.
If  one assumes that free markets are an ideal rarely encountered in reality and that the various 
kinds of  market failure are rather pervasive, government intervention in a market economy will 
often be expedient. On the other hand, government intervention is typically connected with the 
dangers of  not getting it right, that is, of  inefficient design and implementation of  economic 
policies. If  in the 1980s liberal policies have gained acceptance, it is not least because of  the 
meager results that many of  the activist policies in former decades have yielded (e.g. in case of  
the Middle East and North Africa, cf. Nabli, Keller et al. 2006: 20-21).
1 This artictle draws in part on Benner (2012a; 2012b; 2012d).
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Thus,  the  question  probably  is  not  so  much  if  government  should  pursue  some  kind  of  
industrial policy, but rather which one and how (Porter 1990; 1998). If  there is a strong case for 
industrial policy in a market economy, its instruments should be designed and implemented in a 
way that improves the growth potential of  the economy instead of  hampering it by diminishing 
the economy's efficiency.
Therefore, modern instruments of  industrial policy that avoid the dangers encountered by those 
traditionally used but that  at the  same time have the  potential  to  deliver  their  promise of  
raising the living standard of  the populations of  developing countries have to be elaborated. 
This is what this paper attempts to do.
It  starts in the  following section with an overview of  how industrial  policy can be defined. 
Section  3 examines  the  relationship  between industrial  policy  and other  areas  of  economic 
policy. Section 4 presents several instruments of  industrial policy. Section 5 analyzes aspects of  
market conformity of  cluster policy. Finally, section 6 attempts to shed light on the role of  
industrial policy in a wider strategy of  economic development that also contains macro and 
micro-level  policies.  To  illustrate  these  arguments,  the  article  contains  case  studies  about 
industrial policies in Jordan and Egypt.
2 Defining industrial policy
There are many different and partly conflicting definitions of  industrial  policy (e.g.  Conrad 
1987: 4-5 and 20; von Einem 1991: 13; Krumbein 1991: 41; Eichhorn and Greiling 1995: 18; 
Brösse  1999:  1  and 12-15;  Bruch-Krumbein und Hochmuth 2000:  59-60;  Seitz  2000:  32-34; 
Aiginger 2007:  300-302  and 319-320;  Meyer-Stamer  2009:  10-12;  Altenburg 2011b:  7,  10-11; 
Erdle 2011). For example, they differ on whether the term should be confined on manufacturing 
or the industrial sector or cover the whole economy. The U.S. Literature gives preference to a 
definition of  industrial policy that covers the whole economy and thus includes agriculture and 
services, too (e.g. Rodrik 2004: 2; Nabli, Keller et al. 2006: 1). This perspective is used in this 
article.
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The definition used here is that following Benner's (2012a: 76) which in turn based is on von 
Einem (1991: 13). It defines industrial policy
“as the  focused  use  of  measures  of  different  partial  policies.  It 
consciously aims at influencing the change of  the sectoral structure of  
the economy in the long term, either explicitly or implicitly, directly or 
indirectly.  It  pursues  the  goal  of  achieving  results  that  cannot  be 
expected at all, not in the same form, not to the same degree, or not at 
the same time exclusively under market influences” (Benner 2012b: 5).
Thus, the defining characteristic of  industrial policy is its motivation to affect the structure of  
the economy. The different shapes of  this motivation will be discussed later.
3 Industrial policy and structural policy
As  in  the  definition  used  here  the  central  feature  of  industrial  policy  is  its  motivation  to 
influence the structure of  the economy, it forms a part of  structural policy.  Because of  its 
motivation to influence  the  sectoral structure  of  the  economy,  it  can also be  called  sectoral 
structural policy (e.g. Benner 2012a: 75).
But industrial policy is not the only component of  structural policy. The other main part is 
regional  structural  policy.  Although  industrial  policy,  not  least  in  view  of  agglomeration 
tendencies  and  connected  agglomeration  economies,  always  has  spatial  effects  (Altenburg 
2011b: 22), it is not the same as regional structural policy because of  the two notions' different 
motivations. While regional structural policy (Peters 1996: 13; Eckey 2005: 934) aims to affect 
the spatial structure of  the economy, industrial policy targets its sectoral structure. There is, 
however, an intersection of  both at which approaches like cluster policy are located (Benner 
2012a: 81-84; 2012b)
Table 1 summarizes three elementary fields of  economic policy and classifies industrial policy as 
part of  structural policy (Esser, Hillebrand et al. 1996: 2-4 and 28-30; Peters 1996: 25-27; 
Wagner 2008; Rauch 2009: 187-189; Welfens 2010: 516-518; Benner 2012c).
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Table 1: Elementary fields of  economic policy
Market policy Process policy Growth policy
Time frame long-term short and medium term long term
Macroeconomic level Design of  macroeconomic 
aspects of  the economic 
order
Monetary and fiscal policy; 
exchange rate policy if  
applicable
Design of  the 
macroeconomic for 
economic growth (e.g. 
influencing the capital 
stock)
Mesoeconomic level Design of  the general 
framework for single 
industries (e.g. industries 
with specific regulation 
needs)
Interventions in single 
industries or concerning 
single regions to counter 
cyclical crises
Structural policy: industrial 
policy and regional 
structural policy
Microeconomic level Design of  microeconomic 
aspects of  the economic 
order
Design of  microeconomic 
aspects of  stabilization 
policy (e.g. income policy)
Structural policy: industrial 
and regional structural 
policy; microeconomic 
incentives for long-term 
growth 
Source: Benner (2012b: 4); adapted from Benner (2012a: 72).
4 Instruments of  industrial policy
Industrial policy in developing countries can employ a vast array of  instruments (e.g. Altenburg 
2010;  2011b;  Erdle  2011),  many  of  which  are  employed  in  some  way  in  most  developing 
countries. They can be classified, among others, in the following fields of  action:
• completing or augmenting value chains: the value chain perspective (Rauch 2009: 193-198) 
can be used to promote the development of  buyer or supplier industries (Porter 1990). To 
do so, existing localized industries can be used as an anchor. Strictly speaking, this is not 
an  instrument  in  itself  but  a  perspective  in  which  other  instruments  can  be  used 
(Altenburg 2011b: 72-73);
• promoting  entrepreneurship: measures  to  promote  new business  formation  can  be,  for 
example,  courses  or  seminars  for  entrepreneurs,  microfinance,  or  incubators. 
Entrepreneurship education in  schools  and universities  can be  an effective  long-term 
step;
• export  promotion: exporting  businesses  will  need  to  live  up  to  quality  and  efficiency 
standards demanded by international customers. In participating in the global markets, 
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they  have  to  compare  their  performance  with  state-of-the-art  competitors  in  other 
countries. This can lead to  “learning-by-exporting” effects (Altenburg 2010: 19). Thus 
an export orienation of  localized industries can induce upgrading through competitive 
pressure,  as  can  openness  for  imports.  In  addition,  interaction  with  sophisticated 
international customers can lead to learning (e.g. Lundvall 1988).
Businesses in developing countries need to be encouraged and assisted in their efforts to enter 
global  markets.  Programs  for  global  trade  fair  participation,  delegation  visits  to  initiate 
contacts with possible customers or suppliers,  or  targeted export subsidies  are examples for 
supporting measures. Export-import banks can be important agents. 
Policy should generally demonstrate a commitment for open markets. Trade liberalization can 
proceed gradually to give domestic businesses some time to prepare and to adjust (Altenburg 
2011b: 29-30), but this should be well communicated before. Policy should resist the pressure of  
affected businesses lobbying for (continued) protectionism while not concentrating on upgrading 
their  competitiveness.  In  short,  it  should  withstand  the  high  dangers  associated  with 
implementing  an infant-industry  policy  (Nabli,  Kellet  et  al.  2006:  6;  Altenburg  2011b:  55). 
Depending on the political and institutional context, this may be difficult or even impossible. 
Thus, in a such an environment very strong mechanisms for gradual but still rather quick trade 
liberalization must be created;
• investment  promotion: as  with  export  promotion,  attracting  foreign direct  investment 
(FDI)  can  lead  to  intense  competition  and  hence  set  incentives  for  upgrading  (e.e. 
Altenburg 2010: 25). It can be a way to complete or augment localized value chains by 
attracting buyers and suppliers. Thus it can lead to the transfer of  knowledge into a 
developing  country's  economy.  Portfolio  investment  (e.g.  by  sovereign  wealth  funds) 
might be a way to fulfill domestic companies' capital needs;
• financial incentives for investment: Tax incentives and other subsidies can be a way to 
attract FDI (e.g. Altenburg 2010: 27; Erdle 2011: 23-24). Whether this makes sense in 
the long term is an open question. In the short term it can be a rather quick measure to 
kick-start the industrialization process and to provide employment, which is especially 
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important  in  developing  countries  with  high  unemployment  and/or  high  youth 
unemployment  (e.g.  Morocco,  Tunisia).  In  such  a  case,  achieving  quick  results  in 
attracting  FDI  can  be  a  political  necessity.  In  the  long  term,  however,  investment 
decisions  taken  purely  on  cost  (including  tax)  deliberations  can  easily  be  undone. 
Industries locating in a particular developing country for cost and tax considerations can 
and probably will move on once other countries offer relatively more favorable cost or tax 
conditions. This process can be observed, for example, in the garment industry (Benner 
2010;  2011b).  If  a  country  manages  to  upgrade  its  competitive  advantages,  e.g.  by 
offering a better qualified workforce, it can attract other industries. This “flying geese” 
pattern  (Chaponnière  et  al.  2008;  Widodo 2008;  Benner  2010;  2011b)  can indeed  be 
beneficial. But for it to succeed, upgrading is critical. It has to be propelled both in the 
public  sector  (e.g.  in  the  education  system)  and  the  private  sector,  that  is,  through 
private  businesses  strengthening  their  competitiveness.  In  the  latter  case,  FDI  can 
contribute  to upgrading if  induces knowledge transfer.  This  can be  promoted with a 
strategic policy towards FDI. Singapore can serve as an example (Wong 2001; Dahlman 
2007; Benner 2010).
Providing general tax incentives is not sufficient for attracting FDI strategically. Targeted tax 
incentives for research and development, for example, might be more conducive to promoting 
knowledge  transfer.  Thus,  there  needs  to  be  a  shift  from  general  incentives  for  FDI  to 
specifically targeted, strategic ones at a certain point in time if  general incentives are to be 
offered at  all  (to  attract  cost-sensitive  industries,  e.g.  the  garment  industry, low labor  costs 
might be more important than tax incentives, but both can be combined if  necessary).
Still,  endogenous  potentials  should  not  be  neglected  for  three  reasons:  first,  growth  of  
indigenous  businesses  can  create  employment,  too,  and  this  without  the  danger  of  quick 
relocation  abroad  because  their  headquarter  or  “home  base”  functions  which  cannot  be 
relocated  easily  (Porter  1998:  261)  are  located  at  home;  second,  their  growth  can  lead  to 
upgrading the economy, too;  and third, they are supposed to be the receivers  of  knowledge 
transferred by foreign companies as a result of  a strategic FDI policy. Offering widespread and 
generous tax incentives for all kinds of  FDI puts indigenous companies at a disadvantage, at the 
very  least  so  in  the  sense  that  there  might  not  be  enough  resources  left  to  promote  their 
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development (e.g. through assistance for new business formation or the provision of  necessary 
infrastructure  outside  export  processing  zones).  This  calls  for  a  more  balanced approach in 
which general tax incentives should be used only after careful consideration;
 
• (de)regulation: although  (de)regulation  policy  belongs  to  market  policy,  it  can  have 
effects on industrial policy, too. Depending on the markets and possible network effects 
at  work  in  them,  some  degree  of  regulation  might  be  necessary  to  let  competition 
unfoled.  Generally,  deregulation  is  critical  if  existing  bureaucratic  obstacles  hamper 
entrepreneurship. Legitimate needs for regulation need to be balanced with economic 
freedom. According to Porter (1990), some regulation might prove beneficial in the long 
term if  it is in line with secular market trends (e.g. environmental regulation or customer 
protection). In contrast, unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles that unduly constrain growth 
should be abolished (Altenburg 2011b: 29); 
• privatization: privatizing state-owned enterprises can lead to more intense competition 
and  dynamic  (possibly  also  even  static)  efficiency  because  it  offers  a  chance  to  set 
appropriate incentives for the pursuit of  efficiency-enhancing business strategies;
• public investment and procurement: according to Porter (1990), government can act as a 
sophisticated buyer and set incentives for upgrading and intense competition. Yet, this 
should not be confused with Keynesian growth stimulation through public consumption. 
In the sense meant here, government should not spend more but in a more sophisticated 
way. In addition, the perspective pursued by industrial policy is a structural, long-term 
one that does not correspond with the one of  Keynesian stabilization policy that centers 
on mitigating short-term business cycles;
• tourism policy: as  the  cases  of  Egypt  and  Jordan  demonstrate,  tourism is  a  highly 
promising industry if  employment gains are dominant goals of  industrial policy. This 
will be the case in virtually all developing countries. Consequently, for countries with 
natural  or  cultural  assets  attractive  for  tourists,  promoting it  will  often be  a  special 
priority.  For  example,  international  tourism marketing  or  the  designation  of  tourist 
zones can be measures to support it. Considering the public-good character of  tourism 
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(Benner 2012b: 19), a more direct role for public agents will be necessary, especially on 
the local level (Benner forthcoming b);
• institutional  set-up: building  effective  institutions  for  private  sector  development 
including business membership organizations (e.g. Altenburg 2010: 21, 26; 2011b: 49-50) 
like trade associations or chambers of  commerce is a highly important prerequisite for 
the use of  many instruments (Benner 2011b);
• education and science policy: while these fields of  policy are not part of  industrial policy 
in a narrow sense, they are still very important in this context. This is because upgrading 
competitiveness in the long run requires skilled labor and human capital. A country's 
education and science policy and its structures and programs of  technical and vicational 
education and training (TVET) should therefore be in line with the country's stage and 
course of  economic development;
• business climate: a good business climate conducive to entrepreneurship and investment 
constitutes  an  important  framework  condition  for  industrial  policy.  It  includes,  for 
example,  a  fairly  simple  tax  system  with  adequate  rates  as  well  as  a  sufficient 
availability of  infrastructure.  Physical  infrastructure  is  often used with a structural-
policy motivation. It  it  often built  in the hope to help industries  or  regions develop. 
While a basic endowment of  physical infrastructure is important for the economy in 
general,  its  role  should  not  be  overestimated.  Physical  infrastructure  exhibits 
diminishing marginal returns which will, from a certain point, be exceeded by marginal 
cost. At the margin, instruments that enable learning and whose returns to scale may 
even increase will often be a better choice to promote economic growth. Even if  (e.g. in a 
developing country with a very poor  state of  physical  infrastructure)  investments in 
physical infrastructure are necessary and are expected to exhibit high marginal returns, 
it  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  condition  for  long-term growth (Altenburg 
2011b: 29).
• special economic zones: they can be a way to promote investment or export (e.g. in export 
processing  zones)  and  to  induce  or  accelerate  economic  growth  in  their  regions.  In 
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addition to their  function as growth engines, they might be used as a laboratory for 
economic reform and specifically for the use of  industrial policy instruments;
• cluster  policy: at  the  intersection  of  industrial  policy  and  regional  structural  policy, 
promoting  clusters  can be  an  option  to  use  local  or  regional  growth  dynamics  (e.g. 
Altenburg 2010: 23). Cluster policy uses many of  the instruments of  industrial policy 
suggested here but focuses them not only on sectoral, but also on spatial strengths of  the 
economy  (Benner 2012a; 2012b);
• networking:  offering  opportunities  for  businesses  to  interact  with  each  other  might 
initiate input-output linkages and stimulate creativity by interactive learning. This is an 
element of  cluster policy but it can also be used across the whole country, i.e. without a 
spatial focus, either generally, sector or technology-specific or for defined issues relevant 
for businesses across the board. Social media tools may be used to support some aspects 
of  networking;
• knowledge transfer: the diffucion of  localized knowledge into industry can be promoted 
by  instruments  that  foster  collaboration  between  businesses  on  the  one  hand  and 
universities  and research institutions  on  the  other  hand,  e.g.  innovation  vouchers  or 
networking measures like conferences (Altenburg 2011b: 32; Benner 2012a; 2012b).
• knowledge pipelines: international knowledge transfer is important for upgrading because 
domestic businesses need access  to the global state of  knowledge to catch up. Giving 
entrepreneurs, executives, or R&D staff  the opportunity to spend some time in a global 
knowledge center is one way to do so (e.g. German Silicon Valley Accelerator Inc. n.d.). 
Another way is  to give nationals  the  chance to study or work abroad and providing 
incentives for them to return after some time. Attracting branches of  foreign universities 
is a further option, as is the targeted use of  sovereign wealth funds to invest in foreign 
companies that possess specialized knowledge and to encourage them to cooperate with 
domestic partners or to locate R&D facilities in the fund's home country (Benner 2011a; 
2011b). The goal is to have the countries' companies tap into global knowledge pipelines 
(Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell 2004).
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Of  course many other instruments are possible. These are just some non-exclusive examples of  
some fields of  action that industrial policy could focus on. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
services provided as a part of  an industrial policy do not necessarily need to be performed by 
government itself.  Private service providers can be given incentives or even be fully paid by 
government to do so instead of  public agents. This enables competition and might even lead to 
more efficient service provision (Altenburg 2010: 20; 2011b: 33).
Case Study: Jordan's Industrial Policy
In  the  1990s,  Jordan  implemented  reforms  in  trade  and  industrial  policy  combined  with 
macroeconomic stabilization aimed at fiscal consolidation. These measures were assisted by the 
World Bank and the IMF. It contained various measures of  trade and investment liberalization, 
exchange rate liberalization, and the lift of  price controls (World Bank 2012).
Today,  Jordan  has  a  per  capita  GDP  of  USD  6,000,  somewhat  lower  than  Egypt's  and 
considerably lower than Tunisia's but still higher than Morocco's (Central Intelligence Agency 
2012a). Youth unemployment is a major concern, considering that at the beginning of  the new 
millennium,  “almost  60% of  jobseekers,  both  male  and  female,  are  below  the  age  of  25” 
(European Traning Foundation 2005: 28). Demonstrations during the “Arab Spring” in Jordan 
have highlighted the need for growth that leads to better employment perspectives especially 
for the younger parts of  the population. Defined in a broad sense, Jordan's industrial policy 
today includes, for example, the “National Industrial Policy” and a “Jordan Export Promotion 
Strategy”. The country's efforts to develop its tourism industry complement these initiatives. 
Goals of  Jordan's industrial policy are “to create an industry-friendly environment, to protect 
sensitive and vulnerable industries in both private and public sectors and to encourage foreign 
and local investment partnership initiatives” (European Commission and High Representative 
of  the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011: 10).
In a more narrow sense of  industrial  policy, Jordan followed  a “National Industrial Policy” 
initially meant to cover a period between 2009 and 2011. It focused on growth of  the industrial 
sector, exports, employment, and investment. The explicit “National Industrial Policy” aimed 
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at horizontal measures but did not cover agriculture or services (and thus not tourism). One of  
its goals was diversification within the industrial sector. Upgrading product quality was another 
objective. Targeted industries were exporting ones, labor-intensive ones and “high added-value 
industries” (Mahasneh 2008). Examples for these kinds of  industries are pharmaceuticals, olive 
oil, garments, textiles, food production, and information technology (Mahasneh 2008). 
Types of  instruments used by  the “National Industrial Policy” were, for  example,  “indirect 
financial and technical support” (Mahasneh 2008), export and investment promotion, standard 
setting and metrology, and public-private partnerships. The establishment of  special economic 
zones is another measure of  the broader Jordanian industrial policy. It also implemented the 
Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise (Mahasneh 2008; European Commission and High 
Representative of  the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011: 10).
Interestingly  the “National Industrial Policy” also aimed  to “encourage merger of  industrial 
establishments” (Mahasneh 2008) which reminds of  a policy of  building “national champions” 
that is typical for more traditional forms of  industrial policy. The horizontal orientation of  
Jordan's industrial policy though resembles “newer” industrial policy.
The range of  targeted industries suggests a clear orientation on export-led growth and labor-
intensive industries which is a logical consequence of  Jordan's youth unemployment problem. It 
seems as if  Jordan wants to emulate the classical “flying geese” pattern known from East Asian 
newly  industrialized economies  (Chaponnière  et  al.  2008;  Widodo  2008).  Entering 
industrialization through labor-intensive industries like garments and textiles as well as tourism 
and upgrading the industrial  structure  by moving gradually into more  technology-intensive 
sectors is the general thrust of  such a strategy that Jordan apparently tries to pursue (Benner 
2010; 2011b).
Network forms of  policy formulation and implementation with a participatory perspective that 
puts private agents on par with public ones can be a promising way to enable government to use 
bottom-up energy  and know-how and to  ensure  ownership  and empowerment,  which turns 
government agents into “initiators, coordinators and facilitators” (Altenburg 2011b: 19, 31). It 
could be termed community-based industrial policy or, more broadly and also covers regional 
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structural  policy,  community-based  structural  policy.  One  advantage  of  a  (at  least  partly) 
bottom-up policy involving local agents is that existing structures, institutions, and strengths 
(including latent or potential sources of  competitiveness) may show that were not known to the 
central government before (e.g. Kiese 2008b: 26). This can attenuate the danger of  government 
failure in the formulation and implementation of  an industrial policy. Instruments like cluster 
policy offer various opportunities to involve local agents (Benner 2012c; forthcoming a).
Case Study: Industrial Policy in Egypt
Egypt is another interesting example for the use of  industrial policy in developing countries. Its 
economic situation is similar to Jordan's but its political upheavals are far more fundamental. It 
remains to be seen how the new government will shape Egypt's industrial policy but there are 
some general base lines of  the former regime's industrial policy that will probably not be altered 
fundamentally.
One of  these base lines is the opening of  Egypt's economy since the Sadat era in the 1970s and 
especially  since  Mubarak's  accession  to  power  in  1981.  This  opening  succeeded  policies  of  
nationalization, central planning, and protectionism during the 1960s and 1970s. The “infitah” 
policy (حاتفنا) consisted of  measures such as the end of  central planning, the establishment of  
free zones, price and intest rate liberalization, or tax reform (Loewe 2009).
Prior to the 2011 revolution, Egypt's industrial policy focused, for example, on free zones and 
one-stop shops, technology transfer promotion, the availability of  credit and venture capital, 
export promotion, quality infrastructure, and SME promotion through business development 
services and the provision of  incubators (Loewe 2009).
Another base line of  Egypt's industrial  policy  in a broader sense is the high significance of  
tourism. The sector accounted for 2.8 million employees in 2008. Government promotes tourism 
through the Egyptian Tourism Authority and the Tourism Development Authority. Through 
these agencies, it contributes to marketing the country's brand and assists tourism businesses. 
Egypt's  “National Sustainable  Tourism  Strategy  2020” sets  the  target  of  25  million 
international arrivals compared with 12.8 million in 2008. Until 2020, Egypt wants to develop 
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tourist destinations at its Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts, strengthen urban hotel capacities 
and attract residential investment and thus augment the share of  total tourism employment of  
total employment in the whole economy from 13,9 to 14,8 percent, which corresponds to almost 
1.2 million new jobs (GTAI 2012: 37-38). Thus, it aims at considerable growth in the tourism 
sector. To achieve this growth, investment in tourism operations and regulations for purchases 
of  holiday residences were liberaliyed and airport facilities improved. Another measure was the 
development of  training programs for tourism employees (OECD 2010: 294-298).
Considering its high labor intensity, promoting tourism is a useful pathway for a developing 
country with a young and rapidly growing population and high unemployment. The median 
age  in  Egypt  is  only  24.6  years,  its  fertitily  rate  is  at  2.94  children  per  woman  (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2012b). With these strong population dynamics, a high number of  young 
people exiting schools or universities continuously need to be integrated into the labor market.
A growing tourism sector can be a suitable answer to this quandary. Together with other pillars 
of  industrial policy such as trade liberalization, privatization and reinforced regulation, e.g. for 
competition or  consumer  protection  (El-Megharbel  2009),  and  its  noteworthy focus  on 
innovation, it consitutes a multi-faceted industrial policy. Innovation-oriented measures might 
give impulses for growth and competitiveness and thus induce upgrading of  the economy. But 
they are unlikely to lead to high and fast employment growth. Employment perspectives in 
innovative  industries  will  most  likely  be  restricted  to  skilled  workers  and  to  specifically 
university graduates. In addition, employment gains in innovative industries will probably not 
spread out to rural regions. Tourism can complement this “competitiveness pillar” as a kind of  
“employment pillar” that  may  engender effects  in  rural  regions  and  for  non-academically 
trained staff, too. It might, however, not be sufficient to create enough employment to integrate 
the  high possible  growing  numbers of  young jobseekers  into the  labor  market.  In the  new 
political environment after the revolution, an even stronger focus on labor-intensive industries 
including tourism but also encompassing other sectors is likely.
It makes sense to design instruments in ways that foster search processes among entrepreneurs. 
There should be incentives for businesses to look for and experiment with new business models. 
Another  aspect  in  the  design  of  industrial  policy  instruments  is  that  they  should  seek  to 
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overcome industrial fragmentation between different types of  businesses to create an arena for 
linkages and spillovers (e.g.  between large and small firms, domestic and foreign ones, state-
owned and private ones) and to enable pro-poor growth to unfold (Altenburg 2011b: 73-76).
5 Industrial policy versus market policy
According to the definition of  industrial policy presented in section 2, the salient characteristic 
of  industrial policy is its motivation to influence the economy's structure. This can take various 
directions.  The  term  industrial  policy  is  often  understood  as  describing  a  policy  trying  to 
conserve old economic structures (e.g. in agriculture, mining, or heavy industries threatened by 
relocation),2 often with the use of  generous subsidies or protectionist measures. Such a policy is 
understood here as a  “traditional” industrial policy.  Another kind of  industrial policy is one 
aimed at upgrading industries' competitiveness. This is similar to the reasoning of  Erdle (2011: 
4) who defines “long-term growth in total factor productivity” as the primary goal of  industrial 
policy. Such an approach constitutes a  “newer”  form of  industrial policy according to what 
Eichhorn and Greiling (1995: 18) described. This policy it is not about restraining structural 
change. Rather, it is supposed to promote and maybe even accelerate it. This is what several 
East Asian newly industrialized economies did  with many of  the instruments they employed to 
foster economic growth  during their catch-up process that lasted several decades (e.g. Chang 
2001; Hirono 2001; Kang 2001; Wong and Ng 2001). It comes close to the policies examined and 
drafted by Porter (1990). He set them in contrast to more traditional policies which he criticizes 
and terms “industrial policy” (1998: 248-249). A modern industrial policy aims at upgrading the 
economy and, in contrast the zero-sum view of  competition held by more traditional forms. 
demonstrates  an  optimistic  “positive  sum  underlying  view  of  competition,  in  which 
productivity improvements and trade expand the market and many locations prosper if  they 
can become more productive and innovative” (Porter 1998: 249). As Altenburg (2011b: 56) puts 
it, such a policy “encourages search processes”. It is meant to leave them enough freedom for 
the development of  their own strategies to upgrade their competitiveness and set incentives 
accordingly.
2 For a description of  measures of  “traditional” industrial policy cf. European Commission, OECD and European 
Training Foundation (2008: 15-16).
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Newer industrial policy fits much better into a market system. It has the potential to enhance 
the economy's efficiency of  the economy which cannot be said of  many measures employed by 
traditional  industrial  policy  (e.g.  subsidies  focused  on  structural  conservation  and 
protectionism) and generally not of  its  general motivation to restrain structural  change.  As 
traditional industrial policy contravenes market forces which would lead to structural change, it 
cannot  be  market-compliant  (Peters  1996:  188).  Generally,  in  a  market  economy industrial 
policy can be justified only in very specific circumstances (if  at all), especially when some form 
of  market  failure  occurs.  However,  market  failure  may  well  be  rather  the  rule  than  the 
exception in practice (e.g. von Einem 1991: 21-24; Enright 2000: 324-325; 2003: 120-121; Nabli, 
Keller et al. 2006: 5-10; Altenburg 2011b: 13-14, 57).
Cases of  market failure are difficult to verify in reality (Altenburg 2011b: 14) and will often 
require  pragmatic  rules-of-thumb  (Benner  2012a).  Using  pragmatic  and  possibly  imprecise 
heuristics to establish market failure as a case for industrial policy (and to examine whether 
instruments of  market policy can correct it at all and whether the potential benefits of  their use 
outweigh the costs) still  leads to an industrial policy that conforms much more to a market 
system than one guided by arbitrary political decisions (like “picking winners”, e.g.  Altenburg 
2011b:  15)  not  grounded  in  economic  theory  and  analysis.  This  leads  to  a  continuum of  
industrial policy whereby the question is not primarily whether industrial policy is justified at 
all but which policy mix is (Altenburg 2011b: 15), i.e. which ones of  its measures are justified, to 
what degree,  in which cases, and in which particular design. The possibility of  government 
failure, i.e. factors leading to the inability of  government to correctly diagnose market failure 
and to effectively correct it both in strategy formulation and in implementation (which can be 
an even more realistic danger in developing countries than in industrialized ones, as government 
institutions might not have sufficient resources and efficiency to fulfill basic tasks of  economic 
policy),  need  also  be  taken  into  account.  Another  looming  risk  lies  in  limitations  to  the 
willingness of  public agents to pursue efficiency-enhancing policies  due to their rationalities 
according to public-choice theory (Seitz 2000: 171-220; Rodrik 2004:  16; Nabli,  Keller  et  al. 
2006: 7-9; Berg, Cassel and Hartwig2007: 281-282; Kiese 2008a; Welfens 2010: 578; Altenburg 
2011b: 17, 32, 57-58).3
3 Elements of  “industrial policy management capability” that might help prevent some problems in conducting 
industrial policy in developing countries are listed by Altenburg (2011b: 21-22).
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Another aspect concerning the market compliance of  industrial policy is that of  its horizontal 
or  vertical  orientation  (Nabli,  Keller  et  al.  2006:  4-10;  European  Commission,  OECD  and 
European Training Foundation 2008: 15-16; Altenburg 2011b: 12-13; Chahoud 2011: 1). A policy 
modeled  after  a  horizontal  approach  “does not  exclude  measures  aimed  at  promoting 
development  in  priority  sectors,  provided  they  are  not  market  distorting” (European 
Commission,  OECD  and  European  Training  Foundation  2008:  16).  Thus,  e.g.  contrary  to 
Aiginger (2007), horizontal industrial policy is not generally a contradiction to a sectoral focus 
concerning industries,  technologies,  or size classes of  businesses (Peters  1996: 14),  as such a 
focus is to a certain extent a central element of  industrial policy. After all, structural change is 
always about sectors and industries and therefore industrial policy's goal to affect it presupposes 
measures  targeted  on  sectors  that  are  drivers  of  structural  change.  A horizontal  industrial 
policy perceived in this  sense  comes  closes to  what  is  undertood here  as “newer” industrial 
policy.
The sectoral focus should, however, not be too narrow, and should not lead to a static vision. 
“Windows of  opportunity often open up in quite unexpected areas” (Altenburg 2010: 30). If  
and when measures of  industrial policy are used with a sectoral focus, the focus should be broad 
enough  to  allow  for  future  developments  in  markets  and  technology,  including  possible 
convergence.  Sectoral  industrial  policy  should  therefore  be  combined  with  a  broad  policy 
towards economic growth. Although most of  the instruments suggested above can be used with 
or without a sectoral focus,  it  will  often be  necessary to concentrate  them on industries  or 
technologies  (or  size  classes  of  companies)  that  seem  most  promising  in  accordance  with 
observable  market  trends  and growth  signals  (but  not  by simple  political  designation).  For 
example, due to resource constraints, the most intensive support (e.g. the most intensive form to 
use an instrument) will have to be targeted to these sectors. But a basic offer of  support will 
have  to  be  accessible  to  all  companies  and  might  be  complemented  with  sector-unspecific 
measures of  regional policy or with industry or technology-unspecific measures of  structural 
policy aimed ad SMEs.  In particular,  there  will  have to be open offers  of  entrepreneurship 
promotion to all prospective entrepreneurs. In addition, fostering a learning environment will be 
necessary in order to encourage entrepreneurs to experiment and to develop new trajectories in 
their markets and technologies (Altenburg 2010: 30; Benner 2012a: 220-222).
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As promoting growth in developing countries presupposes economic efficiency, newer industrial 
policy is the approach of  industrial policy that should be used here instead of  the traditional 
one. It should be noted that all instruments are possible in both directions. In order to pursue 
the newer thrust of  industrial policy, they should be used in a way that fosters upgrading. This 
includes the need to prevent rent-seeking4 and to overcome principal-agent difficulties (Rodrik 
2004:  17;  Nabli,  Keller  et  al.  2006:  8-9;  Altenburg  2010:  15;  2011b:  19-20).  Finally,  market 
compliance will often call for an exit strategy and a commitment to temporary assistance, i.e. 
measures with a clearly communicated limited time horizon  (Altenburg 2011a: 12; 2011b: 32). 
Industrial  policy should give preference to market forces if  and when they are sufficient to 
achieve the aim of  newer industrial policy, e.g. upgrading competitiveness and creating new and 
durable growth potentials.
Still,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that  private  agents  and  especially  businesses  and 
entrepreneurs are the drivers of  economic growth and structural change (Altenburg 2011b: 7). 
Government,  and hence  industrial  policy,  does  not  “create”  growth.  Thus,  its  relevance for 
economic  development  should  not  be  overestimated.  It  is  by  far  not  a  panacea.  Applied 
efficiently it can still have a positive impact on growth and structural change by facilitating the 
private sector's growth, thus “creating an enabling environment” (Altenburg 2011b: 17). It can 
assist  companies  in  enhancing  their  competitiveness  (Altenburg 2011b:  11),  building  on the 
dynamic  effects  of  competition  instead  of  hampering  it.  In  addition,  industrial  policy 
interventions
“should challenge entrepreneurs and encourage learning and innovation 
rather  than  creating  a  protected  environment  that  suffocates 
entrepreneurial dynamism and technological learning” (Altenburg 2011b: 
29).
Industrial  policy  should focus  on “systemic  competitiveness” (Esser,  Hillebrand et  al.  1996; 
Rauch 2009: 186-193;  Altenburg 2011b:  11-12) instead of  targeting individual  companies in 
single-case decision that disregard effects on other levels of  the economy. Some interventions 
may still benefit single businesses (or industries), but in designing them it is important to judge 
them by the systemic effects they can achieve.
4 For example, if  subsidies are handed out to individual companies, doing so in a competition procedure may offer 
a transparent way that, if  designed well, is less conducive to rent-seeking (Altenburg 2011b: 32).
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Therefore, the role of  industrial policy is indirect but can nevertheless be powerful. Due to this 
indirect  nature,  measures  of  industrial  policy  will  not  always  yield  the  expected  results. 
Applying industrial policy should be guided by a strategic vision and an understanding of  the 
market processes shaping structural change and the policy instruments to affect them. Still, it 
will often be a trial-and-error process that presupposed monitoring and evaluation (Altenburg 
2011b: 9-10, 32-33).
6 Industrial policy as part of  a comprehensive economic policy
There  can be no uniform industrial  policy but always a specific  combination and design of  
instruments from the menu industrial policy offers which is adapted to the particular context of  
the respective country and its economy (Altenburg 2011b).
For example, the institutional setting in developing countries can pose severe limitations for the 
efficiency of  industrial policy. Following Altenburg (2011a; 2011b: 46-47), in political systems 
that can be characterized as neopatrimonial and exhibit political clientelism and patronage as 
well  as strong rent-seeking activities not constrained by effective mechanisms of  checks and 
balances, measures of  industrial policy can easily be employed for special interests or serve as a 
pretext for pork barrel politics, as “politicians and bureaucrats who want to employ industrial 
policy  for  patronage  and  clientelism  can  easily  find  technical  justifications  to  mask  their 
political  objectives” (Altenburg  2011a:  8).  This  leads to  the  sad  conclusion  that  in  such  a 
political context, in the interest of  economic efficiency it could be the best choice not to employ 
an activist industrial policy at all and to forgo its possible  benefits. It is not only that in the 
absence  of  effective  structures  of  government  and administration industrial  policy  can not 
expected to unfold its desired effects; in some institutional contexts industrial policy is likely to 
be misused and then may even do more harm than good. However, it is possible that using some 
single elements from the menu of  industrial policy might be feasible. It needs to be assessed in 
every single  national  (and maybe even regional)  context  which measures  feature only weak 
dangers  of  being  politically  captured.  In  examining  their  cost-benefit  ratio,  the  danger  of  
misuse in a particular political context needs to be considered. Thus, the scope and content of  
the selection of  industrial policy measures to be used in a developing country should not only 
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depend on its  economic structure  and the structural  problems to be solved,  but also on  its 
institutional and political context. In general, protecting industrial policy from being captured 
by political interests is important in industrialized countries, too. It may even be more relevant 
in  many  developing  countries.  After  all,  the  stories  of  East  Asian  newly  industrialized 
economies  suggest  that  with  fairly  efficient  systems  of  governance  and  administration, 
industrial policy can indeed be used in a (on balance) beneficial way for long-term economic 
development (e.g. Chang 2001; Hirono 2001; Kang 2001; Wong and Ng 2001).
Even short of  these spectacularly successful cases, a careful use of  industrial policy can still lead 
to good results  in a somewhat less  propitious but still  (as far as  industrial  policy-making is 
concerned) “not  too  bad” institutional  environment  (e.g.  Altenburg  2010;  Erdle  2011). 
Consequently, it is important to assess the individual institutional context of  a nation as to 
whether is  it  “too bad” or not.  This  assessment should be carried out with regard to every 
feasible industrial policy instrument to select those that can still be applied without causing 
harm. If  upon such individual assessments some instruments turn out to be  applicable,  the 
scope of  application of  at least “some” industrial policy might in the end still be greater than 
the limitations discussed suggest at first sight.
In addition, capacity building for public agents will often be necessary. This is especially true in 
low and lower-middle income countries.  Government agencies  will not  always dispose of  the 
knowledge or  resources  necessary to successfully  design and implement  an industrial  policy 
(Altenburg 2011b: 35-36, 60).
Industrial policy is sometimes perceived as an alternative to liberal  market  policies like those 
embodied by the Washington Consensus (BMZ 2004; Rodrik 2005). Indeed it addresses different 
issues as the Washington Consensus. But this should not be understood as a rejection of  policies 
directed at solid macro and microeconomic conditions.  While traditional forms of  industrial 
policy do not  go well  with liberal  policies  directed at  free  markets,  the  modern current  of  
“newer”  industrial  policy  presupposes  a  considerable  degree  of  macro  and  microeconomic 
stability to unfold its full potential. For example, competitiveness-enhancing export promotion 
instruments require trade liberalization, at least to a certain degree. A solid government budget 
is  necessary  to  avoid  the  crowding-out  of  investments  and  to  reduce  the  danger  of  
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macroeconomic disruptions, as can be seen in the current public-debt induced crisis in southern 
European  countries.  And  a  good  mix  of  deregulation  and  reregulation  as  well  as  prudent 
privatization of  state-owned companies apart from the core areas of  government activity will 
often be important steps to unleash new waves of  innovation and competitiveness.  Thus, a 
“newer”  form  of  industrial  policy  that  aims  at  upgrading  businesses'  competitiveness  and 
policies directed at safeguarding functioning markets need to be combined. Market policy needs 
to  include  the  set-up of  effective  institutions,  as  markets  do  not  appear  from nowhere  but 
require  social  and  institutional  preconditions,  as  well  as  sufficiently  efficient  and  effective 
government activity in its core areas. As far as market policies like the Washington Consensus 
are  understood  to  be  basic  requirements  that  need  to  be  complemented  with  appropriate 
measures of  institution building5 as well as policies that facilitate and enable upgrading (that is, 
“newer” industrial policies), the pursuit of  such industrial policies will most likely be necessary 
in  most  developing  countries.  If  used  alone  –  or  even  without  adaptation  to  the  specific 
characteristics of  the particular country in question – they are much less likely to achieve their 
full potential in unfolding economic growth. Thus, liberal market policies (e.g. the Washington 
Consensus) and “newer” industrial policies belong together in a carefully adjusted policy mix 
(Benner 2010: 20-22).
The case for the use of  industrial policy is rather strong, but all depends on good ways to design 
and implement its instruments:
 
“It is now widely accepted that the countries that managed to catch up 
with the old industrialised and high-income countries are the ones whose 
governments  proactively  promoted structural  change,  encouraging  the 
search for new business models and markets, and channelling resources 
into promising and socially desirable new activities. Evidence of  failed 
industrial  policy experiments, however, is also abundant. Hence, while 
market  failure  justifies  public  intervention  in  principle,  inappropriate 
policies  may  have  worse  results  than  non-intervention” (Altenburg 
2011b: 83).
 
Therefore, a general market orientation such as the one offered by the Washington Consensus 
appears as a good basis for economic development that can be complemented by well-designed 
and well-implemented measures of  industrial policy. Industrial policy interventions that can not 
5 As Williamson (2003: 11) concedes, the original Washington Consensus needs to be complemented by other 
policies, e.g. in concerning income distribution.
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(yet) carried out in a sufficiently effective and efficient manner should be deferred or refrained 
from at all. Alternatively, they might be attempted in a way that does not hold the potential of  
harming the economy too much and of  unduly distorting markets if  they fail. Still, there is a 
very  strong  argument  to  continuously  improve  the  institutional  and  governance-related 
framework for the conduct of  industrial policy. Thus, for low-income countries, building and 
strengthening institutions will often be the primary step in industrial policy. A comprehensive 
strategy of  industrial policy might then evolve in a gradual process.
In sum, industrial policy can conform to a market system. If  designed and carried out in an 
efficient way, it can indeed contribute to an economy's development. But it should not be viewed 
as an alternative to macroeconomic stability and to a solid microeconomic framework. It can 
complement  such policies  as  those  embodied  by the  Washington Consensus  as  a  meso  level 
component. Taken together and carefully adapted to the specifics of  each individual country 
where they are used, these elements can form a potentially powerful development strategy.
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